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This paper examines why mosque opposition has been more frequent in Catalonia 
than in other Spanish regions. A comparison is conducted between the metropolitan 
areas of Barcelona, where opposition has been most prevalent, and Madrid, where it 
has been strikingly absent. A relational approach is employed to highlight the factors 
in Barcelona that have complicated the reception of mosques and the populations 
they serve. These factors include pronounced socio-spatial divisions and a lack of 
confidence in the state‟s commitment to managing the challenges that accompany 
immigration.   The prevalence of these factors in Barcelona has resulted in the 
integration of mosque debates into more general struggles over urban privilege and 
state recognition, explaining the high degree of opposition. These findings highlight 
the importance of studying conflicts related to religious and cultural diversification 
in context, as such conflicts are inextricably linked to the lived spaces and local 
structures in which they develop. 
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Although Islam has had an important influence on Spain historically, it is only 
within the last 30 years that Muslims have re-emerged as a significant presence in 
Spanish society, primarily due to immigration from Africa and South Asia. The growth 
of Spain‟s Muslim population, which now numbers over a million, has led to the 
creation of an elaborate network of community structures to accommodate its religious 
and social needs. These structures, however, have not always been welcomed by host 
communities. This is most evident with respect to houses of worship, as opposition to 
mosques has occurred in 51 different Spanish municipalities. While the presence of 
opposition to mosques is not particularly surprising or unique in the post-September 11
th
 
world, the level of regional variation within Spain is striking. In most regions with large 
Muslim populations, opposition to mosques has been quite rare, whereas in Catalonia 
opposition has taken place in 30 different municipalities (Figure 1 and Table 1). The 
aim of this paper is to shed light on the factors that account for why mosque opposition 
has been more frequent in Catalonia than in other regions of Spain. In examining this 
question, I focus specifically on the metropolitan areas of Barcelona (Catalonia), where 
mosque opposition has been the most frequent and intense, and Madrid, where 
opposition has been surprisingly absent. 
Figure 1: Municipalities Host to Mosque Opposition in Spain 
 
Source: Author‟s review of Spanish press and SOS Racismo‟s annual reports on racism in Spain. 
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Table 1: Muslim Communities, Mosques, and Mosque Opposition in Selected 
Regions 
Autonomous 
Community 
Muslim 
Population 
% Total 
Population 
Mosques Cities Host to 
Mosque 
Opposition 
Catalonia 326,697 4.4   135* 30 
Madrid 220,418 3.5     68** 0 
Andalusia 206,568 2.5 72 3 
Valencia 148,108 2.9 63 8 
Murcia 68,352 4.7 42 3 
Canary Islands 58,635 2.8 17 0 
Castile La Mancha 40,782 2.0 36 0 
Melilla 37,763 51.5 4 0 
Aragon 35,685 2.7 25 0 
Balearic Islands 32,431 3.0 25 2 
Ceuta 32,374 41.2 37 0 
Castile and León 25,233 1.0 12 2 
Basque Country 20,627 1.0 14 1 
Extremadura 15,571 1.4 8 1 
Navarra 13,310 2.1 12 0 
La Rioja 12,373 3.9 10 0 
Galicia 8,762 0.3 13 1 
Sources: For Muslim populations and Islamic entities, Observatorio Andalusí (2009); for total 
populations, Instituto Nacional de Estadística (2008 municipal censuses); for municipalities host to 
mosque opposition, the author‟s review of Spanish press and SOS Racismo‟s annual reports on racism in 
Spain. 
* According to the Generalitat, Catalonia‟s Regional Government, there are 169 mosques in Catalonia. 
** According to the Fundación de Pluralismo y Convivencia, a governmental foundation based in 
Madrid, there are roughly 80 mosques in Madrid. 
 
Theories of Intergroup Conflict 
A substantial amount of recent work on intergroup conflict has focused specifically 
on relations between immigrant minorities and their host communities, a fact that is not 
surprising given the magnitude of population movements within and between countries 
over the last fifty years. Despite the extensive literature on this topic, however, theories 
of intergroup conflict have remained relatively thin and have not developed 
significantly since the seminal works of scholars such as G. Allport (1954), H. Blaylock 
(1967), M. Sherif (1966), and H. Tajfel (1978). Recent work has done little to advance 
our understanding of why certain recipient contexts are characterized by high levels of 
tension and conflict between newly-arrived immigrant populations and their host 
communities, while others are not.   
Existing theories of intergroup conflict may be distinguished broadly by their 
emphasis on either cultural or material sources of contention. Scholars who focus on the 
cultural dimensions of conflict generally point to the detrimental impact of xenophobic 
attitudes and other types of social prejudice on intergroup relations. Most argue that 
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although “old-fashioned” prejudice premised on the innate biological inferiority of 
minorities has fallen into disfavor, prejudice remains present in a “symbolic” or 
“modern” form constituted by unacknowledged negative sentiments toward certain 
minorities and beliefs that the cultural norms and practices of these minorities violate 
core principles and values of majority society (D. KINDER & D. SEARS, 1981; J. 
MCCONAHAY & J. HOUGH, 1976; J. MCCONAHAY, 1986; F. PINCUS & H. 
EHRLICH, 1994; D. SEARS ET AL., 1979; D. SEARS & P. HENRY, 2003). Recent 
work emphasizing the cultural dimension of conflict has placed particular significance 
on the role of national identity. Specifically, scholars have argued that negative 
reactions toward immigrant populations derive largely from the threat they are 
perceived to pose to national cohesion and cultural values (M. HJERM, 1998; 2004; N. 
LEWIN-EPSTEIN & A. LEVANON, 2005). 
In the case of Spain, those partial to cultural explanations of ethnic conflict might 
argue that mosque opposition in Spain is rooted in the deeply-entrenched negative 
images of “Moors” present in the Spanish imaginary. Given that North Africans are the 
most significant Muslim collective in the country, these images may have a particularly 
detrimental influence on Muslim immigrants. Moreover, terrorist attacks and other 
episodes of contention involving Muslims over the past decade have reinforced negative 
sentiments and beliefs about the incompatibility of Islam with Spanish values. With 
respect to Catalonia in particular, it might be added that the strength of national identity 
in the region has created an especially high degree of concern regarding the threat posed 
by Muslim immigrants to Catalan identity, culture, and values. For example, A. Prado 
(2008) argues that the high level of mosque opposition in Catalonia is the product of a 
general intolerance of Islam that has deep historical roots in the region. 
The historical and contemporary „Othering‟ of Muslims certainly contributes to the 
emergence of tension surrounding mosques. Negative stereotypes help to explain, in 
part, why mosques are generally perceived as a threat, as opposed to a potential source 
of social and cultural enrichment, or why they are viewed with more suspicion than 
Protestant churches, despite the fact that both cater largely to immigrant populations. 
However, in the vast majority of instances, mosques are established without complaint 
from local residents. Moreover, prejudices against North Africans and fears regarding 
Islam are common throughout Spain, but mosque opposition has occurred very 
unevenly across regions. If prejudices and fears were the main cause of opposition, we 
would expect a high degree of opposition in Madrid, which has Spain‟s second largest 
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Muslim community, hosts at least 68 mosques, and suffered a direct attack by Muslim 
extremists in 2004. Yet opposition has been completely absent in Madrid.   
Finally, as I will explain in more detail below, it is doubtful that mosque opposition 
in Catalonia is reducible to the region‟s strong national identity, given that many of the 
communities that have mobilized against mosques in the region are composed of 
internal migrants and their offspring.
1
 The most intense conflicts between Muslim and 
non-Muslim populations, including the 1999 riots in Terrassa and episodes of mosque 
contention in Premià de Mar, Santa Coloma, and Badalona, were organized by residents 
of predominantly Spanish-speaking neighborhoods.
2
 If attitudes toward Muslim 
immigrants are indeed more negative in Catalonia than in other Spanish regions, this is 
likely more so the consequence than the cause of contentious local relations (H. 
BLUMER, 1958; M. SHERIF, 1966).  
Realistic conflict theory provides a „materialist‟ alternative to theories that attribute 
conflict to prejudice, intolerance, or other „irrational‟ sentiments. Proponents of realistic 
conflict theory assert that discriminatory attitudes and practices result from objective or 
perceived conflicts of interest rooted in competition over economic resources or 
political power (H. BLALOCK, 1967; R. LEVINE & D. CAMPBELL, 1972; M. 
SHERIF, 1966). Competition increases the salience of ethnic boundaries and leads 
members of majority collectives to fear that minorities threaten their individual welfare 
or group position (H. BLUMER, 1958; L. BOBO, 1983; S. OLZAK, 1992). From this 
perspective, mosques may be viewed as symbolic of a new presence that threatens the 
economic livelihood and political dominance of autochthonous residents.  
It is indeed the case that Spaniards frequently complain about the competition 
brought about by immigrant businesses, as well as the disproportionate allocation of 
public resources to foreign populations. But again, such complaints are present 
throughout the country. In addition, mosque opposition has occurred primarily during a 
period of major economic growth and predominantly in a region with one of the highest 
                                                 
1
 Through my interviews, I discovered that many of these internal migrants can speak Catalan but elect to 
speak Spanish because it is the language of their peers, and they feel more comfortable speaking their 
mother tongue.  In essence, they often choose to maintain their identities as migrants and feel little need 
to demonstrate their Catalanidad to others who reside in their localities.  Hence, it is unlikely that their 
apprehensions regarding immigration derive primarily from fears that an increased presence of foreigners 
in their neighborhoods will hinder their being recognized as Catalans. 
2
 The riots in Terrassa were catalyzed by a series of fights between North African and Spanish youth.   
Although mosques were targeted by vandals, the demonstrations and rioting that took place focused more 
generally on the presence of North Africans, as opposed to mosques per se.  These events constituted the 
first major conflict between immigrant and native populations in Spain.  
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per capita incomes and lowest unemployment rates (Figures 2 and 3). In fact, between 
1995 and 2007, when the vast majority of mosque opposition in Catalonia took place, 
the region‟s per capita income nearly doubled from 14,000 to 27,500 Euros.3 If 
competition over scarce resources were really the main factor explaining mosque 
opposition, we would expect to see more opposition in Andalusia, which hosts one of 
the country‟s largest Muslim populations and traditionally has had one of Spain‟s 
highest rates of poverty and unemployment.
4
 Finally, roughly three quarters of Muslim 
residents in Spain cannot vote because they lack Spanish citizenship, and hence it would 
be a stretch to claim that they represent a political threat, at least not a direct one 
(OBSERVATORIO ANDALUSÍ, 2008).   
Figure 2: Average Income in Spanish Regions with Over 100,000 Muslim 
Inhabitants 
 
Source: Compiled by author using data from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Encuesta de Población 
Activa. 
 
  
                                                 
3
 Although there were a few sporadic episodes of mosque opposition in Spain prior to the late 1990s , 
most notably in Granada (Andalusia) and Vic (Catalonia), mosque opposition did not begin to become 
commonplace or intense  until the late 1990s and early 2000s (see Appendix).   
4
 In fact, Seville, the city where the most intense mosque opposition in Andalusia has taken place, has a 
very small Muslim population relative to other areas of the region. 
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Figure 3: Unemployment Rates in Spanish Regions with Over 100,000 Muslim 
Inhabitants 
 
Source: Compiled by author using data from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Encuesta de Población 
Activa. 
 
Toward a Relational Approach to Theorizing Contexts of Reception 
The shortcomings of both symbolic racism and realistic conflict theory for 
explaining mosque opposition and other episodes of contention between immigrants and 
their host communities reside in their relative inattentiveness to the broader network of 
relations present in contexts of immigrant reception. Generalized prejudices and 
concerns about competition manifest themselves in different ways and bear distinct 
relations to collective action, depending on the characteristics of the relational settings 
in which they are operative. Following M. Somers (1993, p. 595), a “relational setting” 
may be defined as “a patterned matrix of institutional relationships among cultural, 
economic, social, and political practices.”  Theorizing contexts of reception as relational 
settings requires us to move away from attributing attitudes and practices toward 
immigrants to static and generic categorical distinctions, such as group membership or 
class position, and pushes us to examine the broader matrix of relationships within 
which such distinctions function. It also pushes us to look at how different spheres of 
interaction relate to one another, as opposed to examining any given sphere in isolation. 
For example, while economic competition certainly generates concerns about the entry 
of immigrant populations, such concerns take on different meanings and levels of 
significance, depending on the broader network of cultural and social relations within 
which they are embedded.   
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Advocating a relational approach to analyzing contexts of reception, however, is 
not synonymous with saying that all things are inter-related and thus matter equally. 
Rather, depending on the specific issue at hand, certain characteristics of relational 
settings are particularly significant.
5
 With respect to social conflict during periods of 
immigration and ethnic diversification, I wish to highlight three factors that are 
especially important to consider: 1) the salience of social distinctions that pre-date 
immigrant arrival; 2) the extent to which these distinctions map onto spatial divisions; 
and 3) the perceived level of government responsiveness to local priorities and needs.    
Where social distinctions along class or cultural lines are pronounced, struggles 
over local relations of privilege emanating from inequalities in urban life are likely to be 
prevalent. This increases the probability that the entry of immigrant newcomers will 
inflame pre-existing struggles that aim either to resist or defend extant relations of 
privilege. A related, but analytically distinct factor speaks to the extent to which such 
social distinctions map onto spatial divisions. In municipalities that are segregated along 
socioeconomic lines, lower-class immigrants are likely to settle in narrowly-
circumscribed areas as a result of infra-municipal disparities in real-estate value. High 
levels of clustering increase the visibility of immigrants and concentrate in a few select 
neighborhoods the challenges brought about by their presence. In marginalized 
neighborhoods, this has the effect of evoking feelings among long-term residents of 
being overburdened by the changes associated with immigration, as well as concerns 
about incipient processes of „ghettoization.‟ In more privileged areas, especially those 
that have elevated their status over time, residents are likely to fear that the entry of 
immigrant collectives both threatens the privileged status of their neighborhoods and 
places the improvements they have achieved in jeopardy. There are obvious parallels 
between such concerns and the concerns discussed by realistic conflict theorists, but 
realistic conflict theorists generally focus solely on competitive processes between 
individuals and groups, to the neglect of processes related to the specific places in 
which distinct groups coexist. Fears regarding immigration often relate centrally to 
transformations of place (i.e., neighborhood degradation, territorial stigmatization, and 
insecurity), which may include competition but are certainly not limited to it. Hence it is 
important to be attentive to the relations that residents bear both to their particular 
                                                 
5
 In M. Somers‟ analysis of citizenship, for instance, solidarity and autonomy constituted preconditions 
for the emergence of associational and participatory practices that served as the bedrock for citizenship 
rights in England (p. 603).  
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neighborhoods and to their municipalities as a whole if we are to understand why 
immigrant presence is perceived as more threatening in some contexts than in others.   
The final factor speaks to relations between local residents and their local 
governments. In municipalities where residents lack faith in the local government‟s 
commitment to protecting their interests and addressing their needs, residents are more 
likely to take their own initiative in defending the image and well-being of their 
neighborhoods. Given that the arrival of foreign, working-class immigrants is often 
associated with neighborhood degradation and decline, opposing the presence of 
immigrants and their communal structures is one key way that residents feel they may 
act to defend their neighborhoods. By contrast, in municipalities where local 
governments are perceived as responsive to residents‟ needs and priorities, residents are 
more likely to leave it to city officials and bureaucrats to address the challenges brought 
about by ethnic diversification. 
As I will explain in more detail below, the timing of industrialization, past waves of 
internal migration, and the presence of a strong national identity in Catalonia have 
combined to generate significant social and spatial divisions between Catalan- and 
Spanish-speaking populations and neighborhoods in the region‟s industrial cities, 
which, in turn, have given rise to infra-municipal rivalries, inequalities, and deficits that 
have complicated the reception of mosques and the populations they serve. Specifically, 
debates about mosques, and immigration more generally, often have been integrated 
into broader struggles surrounding urban privilege that pre-date the arrival of Muslim 
immigrants to the region. Moreover, a general lack of confidence in local governments‟ 
commitment to protecting the image and well-being of certain neighborhoods has led 
residents of these areas to feel that they must take it upon themselves to protect against 
processes of degradation and decline associated with increased immigration. Since 
mosques are often perceived as „magnets‟ that attract more immigrants to a given area, 
residents feel that opposing mosques is an effective way to limit further entry of 
immigrants into their neighborhoods.     
 
Research Design and Methods 
Prior to discussing the methods that I employed to analyze mosque opposition in 
Spain, let me first clarify that the expression “mosque opposition” refers here to 
organized attempts by local residents to shut down an existing mosque or to prevent the 
establishment of a new mosque. Although I use the term “mosque” throughout, I am 
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most often referring to oratories, or prayer rooms, located in apartments, garages, and 
warehouses, as these are far more common than purpose-built mosques in Spain.
6
  In 
most instances, mosque opposition has taken the form of petition campaigns that aim to 
dissuade local governments from authorizing the use of a given locale for religious 
worship. These campaigns are generally organized either by neighborhood associations 
or by ad hoc pressure groups formed specifically for the purpose of opposing mosques. 
They have varied in magnitude due to differences in both the size of the municipalities 
in which they have been initiated and the intensity of resident opposition. In many 
instances, petition campaigns have mobilized hundreds, or even thousands, of 
signatures.
7
There have also been instances, however, where such campaigns have 
gathered under 100 signatures. Since media coverage has not reported the total number 
of signatures gathered in all cases, it is unfortunately not possible to provide a 
systematic account of how petition campaigns have varied in magnitude.   
In addition to initiating petition campaigns, residents have taken to the streets on 
occasion to demonstrate in opposition to mosques.
8
 Street demonstrations generally 
have taken place in historically symbolic plazas that are emblematic of the 
neighborhoods or municipalities in which they are located. Notable anti-mosque 
demonstrations have occurred in the Catalonian municipalities of Mataró, Premià de 
Mar, Reus, Santa Coloma, and Viladecans, as well as in Seville (Andalusia) and 
Talayuela (Extremadura).  
The few instances where local governments have closed mosques or prevented the 
opening of new mosques in the absence of popular mobilization are not included in the 
definition of mosque opposition used in this paper.
9
 Nor does this definition include 
isolated instances of vandalism, such as the spray painting of mosques. Part of the 
problem with including instances of vandalism is that, in contrast to petition campaigns 
and street protests, they are not always viewed as „newsworthy,‟ and hence it is difficult 
to determine exactly where and when they have occurred. A review of the Spanish 
                                                 
6
 “Purpose-built mosques” are mosques that are originally designed for the purpose of prayer. They are 
easily identifiable from the outside by their architecture.  Despite having Spain‟s largest Muslim 
population, Catalonia does not possess a purpose-built mosque.   
7
 The largest campaign was organized in Badalona (Catalonia), where 20,800 signatures opposing a 
mosque in the city were presented to the municipal government in 2007. Campaigns that have mobilized 
over a thousand signatures have also been carried out in seven other municipalities in Catalonia, three in 
Valencia, one in Andalusia, and one in Murcia. 
8
 Almost all street demonstrations have been accompanied by petition campaigns. 
9
 Such instances are more common in Catalonia than in other regions of Spain as well, but they often 
appear to be the result of purely technical decisions based on the compliance of mosques with municipal 
ordinances. 
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media indicates that vandalism has been much more common and serious (i.e., the 
burning of mosques) in Catalonia than elsewhere in the country.
10
 But very often, such 
acts are isolated to a few individuals and hence may not reflect broader sentiments of 
the community.   
Documentation of mosque opposition was obtained from a thorough review of 
articles that have been digitized and indexed in the online databases of My News and 
WebIslam. These databases include articles from major newspapers and news wires, 
such as Europa Press, El País, ABC, El Mundo, La Vanguardia, and La Razón, as well 
as a wide selection of provincial and local dailies from regions throughout Spain. 
Information was also collected from the annual reports of SOS Racismo, an NGO 
dedicated to fighting racism and discrimination. These reports contain extensive 
documentation of inter-ethnic contention throughout Spain and have devoted a 
significant amount of attention to mosque opposition. Analyzing these sources enabled 
me not only to document the presence of opposition, but also to see how local residents 
have publicly articulated their reasons for opposition, the different actors that have been 
involved in mosque polemics, and the trajectories these polemics have followed over 
time.   
In addition to a review of Spanish press and the annual reports of SOS Racismo, 
ethnographic fieldwork and semi-structured interviews were conducted in Catalonia and 
Madrid between June of 2007 and December of 2009. I focused on the metropolitan 
areas of Barcelona (Catalonia) and Madrid, which I selected due to the stark 
discrepancy between the reactions evoked by mosques in their industrial cities, despite 
the similarities of these cities with respect to a range of demographic, social, and 
economic indicators.
11
 Specifically, the areas of Barcelona and Madrid constitute the 
two largest industrial centers in Spain, contain several municipalities with populations 
of over 100,000 inhabitants, host proportionally similar immigrant populations, and are 
home to the country‟s largest Muslim communities. Yet 14 municipalities have been 
host to mosque opposition in Barcelona, while not a single municipality has been host to 
mosque opposition in Madrid.  
                                                 
10
 Incendiary devices were used to set fire to mosques in the Catalonian municipalities of Girona and Sant 
Boi de Llobregat. Attempts to burn mosques were also made in Cervera and Terrassa, which are also 
located in Catalonia.     
11
 The metropolitan area of Barcelona is defined in accordance with the specifications of the Pla 
Territorial General de Catalunya.  This is the definition used by the Statistical Institute of Catalonia.  The 
metropolitan area of Madrid is defined in accordance with the Statistical Institute of the Community of 
Madrid‟s zoning classification, NUTS 4. 
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In Barcelona, fieldwork was conducted in Badalona, Mataró, and Santa Coloma, 
while in Madrid, it was conducted in Fuenlabrada, Getafe, and Parla (Table 2). 
Municipalities in Barcelona were selected so as to obtain a diverse sample of 
neighborhoods that have been host to mosque opposition. In Badalona, opposition has 
occurred largely in the most marginal of neighborhoods, in Mataró on the border 
between one of the poorest neighborhoods and a more affluent neighborhood, and in 
Santa Coloma in a lower middle-class neighborhood of relatively high status within the 
city. In Madrid, municipalities were selected for their comparability to those selected in 
Barcelona with respect to the size of their overall and foreign populations. In addition, 
they host some of the largest Muslim communities in the region.  
Table 2: Selected Characteristics of Research Sites 
Metropolitan 
Area 
Municipality Total 
Population 
Foreign 
Population 
Muslim 
Population 
Mosques 
Barcelona 
Badalona 215,000 13% 14,000 1 
Mataró 120,000 16% 10,500 3 
Santa Coloma de Gramenet 117,000 19% 8,500 2 
Madrid 
Fuenlabrada 195,000 12% 6,000 2 
Getafe 164,000 14% 4,000 2 
Parla 108,000 24% 8,000 1 
Sources: Compiled by author using data from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (2008 municipal 
censuses) and information collected at research sites. 
A total of 121 semi-structured interviews were conducted in Barcelona and Madrid 
between 2007 and 2009. Initial interviewees were identified based on their public 
involvement in mosque disputes or by their activity in relevant associations and 
organizations in areas of focus. Additional interviewees were recruited either by means 
of “snowball sampling” or in public settings, such as bars, shops, and recreational 
facilities. They included members of neighborhood associations and local residents, 
leaders of Muslim religious and cultural associations, municipal and regional 
government officials and bureaucrats, intercultural mediators, a journalist and a Catholic 
priest. Presidents and other officers of neighborhood associations played a particularly 
important role as informants, as they were the most in touch with general community 
sentiments and received the majority of complaints surrounding mosques. In some 
cases, these officers themselves were instrumental in organizing mosque opposition 
campaigns. All interviews were conducted in Spanish and later translated into English.   
The ethnographic component of my fieldwork consisted of observing social 
dynamics in city plazas, talking informally in bars and restaurants, and visiting religious 
centers. In addition, I participated in interreligious dialogues, attended community 
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forums and celebrations, and went to several neighborhood association meetings. In one 
of my research sites in Barcelona (Badalona), opposition to a proposed mosque emerged 
unexpectedly during the course of my fieldwork in 2009. Having the chance to actually 
see a mosque polemic in process and to speak with relevant parties added a layer of 
richness to my data that would not have been possible had I relied solely on residents‟ 
recollection of past events and media coverage.   
 
Migration and Urbanization in Barcelona 
The reception of mosques in the metropolitan area of Barcelona has been 
complicated by the pronounced social and spatial divisions that exist within its 
industrial and formerly industrial cities. Prior to discussing the relation between these 
divisions and mosque opposition, it is important to understand their precise character, as 
well as how they have evolved over time. Poorer neighborhoods in Barcelona‟s major 
cities are mainly composed of Spanish-speaking internal migrants to the region and 
their offspring. Wealthier neighborhoods, by contrast, are generally composed of either 
long-standing residents whose roots in Catalonia extend for generations or internal 
migrants who have been able to elevate their social status over time. These patterns in 
turn are traceable to the historical evolution of the area through successive waves of 
migration.  
Migration to Barcelona has been driven largely by its traditionally strong industrial 
sector. While most regions of Spain did not industrialize until the 20
th
 century, 
Barcelona underwent significant industrialization during the early- to mid-19
th
 century. 
The demand for labor generated by its industries, especially those devoted to textile 
production, metal fabrication, and chemical processing, has attracted migrants from 
rural areas of Catalonia and other regions of Spain for over 100 years. The entry of 
internal migrants to the region reached its peak between 1960 and 1975, and came to be 
known colloquially as the “pacific invasion” (S. GINER, 1980; J. RECAÑO & A. 
SOLANA, 1998; L. RECOLONS, 2003). During this period, migrants came primarily 
from Andalusia, Extremadura, Murcia, and other regions that were distant 
geographically, culturally, and linguistically from Catalonia.   
Upon arriving to Barcelona, these migrants faced a significant degree of 
discrimination and spatial segregation in the cities in which they settled (F. CANDEL, 
1965; C. SOLÉ, 1982). Their difficulties integrating into urban life derived, in part, 
from the broader context of national struggle taking place under Franco‟s dictatorship at 
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the time. In an effort to centralize Spain, Franco had banned the use of Catalan in public 
life and had discouraged its private usage through propaganda campaigns. The rapid 
entry of internal, Spanish-speaking migrants to Catalonia was perceived by many as part 
of a more general assault upon Catalonia‟s language and culture (J. COLOMER, 1986).   
Arguably more important than the exclusivity of native residents, however, were a 
host of urban factors that limited the integration of internal migrants into the cities in 
which they settled.   By the time the major migration boom between 1960 and 1975 
took place, many city centers in the Barcelona metropolitan area were already well-
developed, densely populated, and expensive, largely due to the transformations brought 
about by prior waves of migration. In combination with a general lack of urban planning 
and regulation, as well as rampant speculation, this led to the relegation of internal 
migrants to marginalized peripheral “suburbs” composed of shanties and other types of 
seriously deficient “infra-housing” (J. COSTA ET AL., 2003; J. REQUENA 
HIDALGO, 2003; C. SOLÉ, 1982; J. VILLARROYA I FONT, 1999). 
 
Continuities between Past and Present 
Toward the middle of the 1960s, a general loosening of the Franco regime‟s 
repressive approach toward addressing community complaints and claims enabled civic 
associations to voice their discontent with the conditions present in peripheral 
neighborhoods and to place pressure on city authorities to address municipal deficits. 
Civic struggles intensified during the waning years of the dictatorship, and their impact 
became visible upon Spain‟s transition to democracy in 1978, as significant investments 
were made to rehabilitate marginalized neighborhoods. The infrastructural deficiencies 
and spatial divisions rooted in the chaotic development of the 1960s and 1970s, 
however, have lingered on to the present, especially in cities in Barcelona (J. COSTA 
ET AL., 2003). Moreover, many of the deficits and problems that seemed to have been 
receding in poorer neighborhoods since the 1980s have re-emerged and worsened in 
recent years as a result of the confluence of two related developments: 1) significant 
growth in Catalonia‟s overall population, primarily due to foreign immigration; and 2) a 
major rise in the price of real estate and consequent decline in access to affordable 
housing (Figures 4 and 5) (O. NEL·LO I COLOM, 2008).   
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Figure 4: Evolution of Catalonia’s Total Foreign Population (1996-2008) 
 
Source: Compiled by author using data from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística.  
 
Figure 5: Evolution of the Average Price of Housing in Catalonia (1996-2008) 
 
Source: Compiled by author using data from the Generalitat de Catalunya, Departament de Medi Ambient 
i Habitatge. 
 
The growth in Catalonia‟s population over the past decade has resulted primarily 
from the large-scale entry of working-class, non-communitarian immigrants to the 
region. These immigrants have been attracted by Catalonia‟s high demand for labor, 
especially in the sectors of construction, services, and agriculture. The demand for 
construction workers, in particular, was driven by a nation-wide real-estate boom during 
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which the cost of housing increased dramatically.
12
 While many profited from the 
boom, affordable housing became increasingly difficult to access for a large segment of 
Catalonia‟s population, most notably the masses of laborers who had entered the 
country to meet the high demand for construction workers.   
Although the boom was a nation-wide phenomenon in Spain, it had a particularly 
significant impact on exacerbating infra-municipal inequalities in Catalonia due to the 
pre-existing socio-spatial divisions characteristic of municipalities in the region. 
Specifically, the vast majority of newly-arrived, working-class immigrants to the region 
were forced to reside in the poorest of neighborhoods, generally located in peripheral 
areas or old and rundown historical centers, which already suffered from overcrowding 
and poor infrastructure.   
By contrast, municipalities with less pronounced infra-municipal inequalities, such 
as those located in the metropolitan area of Madrid, foreign immigrants were able to 
settle more evenly across neighborhoods. Indeed, a recent study demonstrates that the 
concentration of immigrants in select areas reaches more extreme levels in Barcelona, 
particularly in cities that have been host to mosque opposition, than in other 
metropolitan areas with large Muslim populations, such as Madrid and Valencia (J. 
LÓPEZ REDONDO & A. REY CARNEIRO, 2008). Similarly, a study by Colectivo 
IOÉ (2005) advances data showing that 26% of immigrants in Catalonia live in 
buildings in which more than half of the residents are of foreign origin, compared to just 
17% in Madrid and 13% in Valencia.    
 
Socio-spatial Divisions and Mosque Opposition 
The relatively heavy clustering of working-class immigrants in narrowly 
circumscribed areas has reinforced extant divisions between privileged and 
marginalized neighborhoods in Barcelona‟s metropolitan area. Residents of 
marginalized neighborhoods frequently complain that they have been disproportionately 
burdened by the heavy influx of immigrants in recent years and voice fears about the 
danger of their neighborhoods becoming “ghettos.”  Moreover, given that poorer 
neighborhoods, as opposed to wealthier ones, tend to be more densely populated and 
more lacking in basic municipal services and facilities, working-class residents often 
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 It is not the place here to go into the complex array of factors that contributed to the elevation of 
housing prices in Spain between 1996 and 2007. For a succinct summary of the major explanations 
advanced by experts on the subject, see O. Nel·lo (2008).  
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associate the concentration of immigrants in their neighborhoods with growing urban 
deficits and problems of overcrowding.   
Mosques in particular are perceived not only as symbolic of immigrant presence 
but as „magnets‟ that attract more immigrants to a given area, heightening fears of 
„ghettoization,‟ increased territorial stigmatization, and processes of neighborhood 
degradation. This is exemplified by the following excerpt from a recent manifesto 
written by residents opposing a mosque in Artigas, one of the poorest neighborhoods of 
Badalona: 
 
[W]e do not estimate that the opening of a mosque in our neighborhood is 
acceptable, in these moments, for (the sake of) coexistence and for (the sake of) 
impeding our conversion into a ghetto, if we are not one already. We are concerned 
that that mosque, moreover, will be converted into a county-wide referent for 
Muslims, leading to an even greater over-occupation of public spaces which 
generates problems of coexistence.  
 
Comparable views have been expressed in other cities, such as Mataró, where 
socioeconomic divisions across neighborhoods are similarly stark. Purificación, a 64-
year-old resident who signed a petition to oppose a mosque on the fringe of her 
neighborhood in 2001 states: 
 
If they put a mosque here, we will be crowded to the maximum... This is a small 
neighborhood and the moment they place a mosque here, all the Muslims would 
come here from all of Mataró and from Mataró‟s surroundings. 
 
Reflecting on the opposition that took place in Mataró in 2001, Roser, a 50-year-old 
resident, adds: 
 
This is already a ghetto... For people from the outside, this is a ghetto. Just imagine 
if there was a mosque here. 
 
According to newspaper reports, concerns about the formation of “ghettos” have 
been associated with the presence of mosques in a number of other Catalonian cities as 
well, including Banyoles, Igualada, Lleida, Premià de Mar, Reus, Sant Feliu de Guíxols, 
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and Viladecans. It is important to keep in mind, however, that although residents often 
refer to their neighborhoods as “ghettos,” these neighborhoods are quite distinct from 
traditional racial or ethnic ghettos found in the US. That is, they are not ethnically 
homogenous, the majority of residents are still native to Spain, and they remain 
functionally tied to more affluent neighborhoods.
13
 Indeed, it is precisely because these 
neighborhoods remain ethnically diverse and enjoy a decent level of urban 
infrastructure and amenities that they have taken on the features of what G. Suttles 
(1972) has termed “defended neighborhoods,” including sharp boundary definition and 
defense, and practices of exclusivity toward those perceived as „outsiders‟ or „invaders‟ 
(J. RIEDER, 1985; T. SUGRUE, 1996).   
In some cases, Muslim communities have attempted to establish mosques in more 
affluent neighborhoods, often at the behest of city governments trying to evade mosque 
conflict and ethnic clustering by ceding land in neighborhoods with less dense 
immigrant populations. Nevertheless, opposition has emerged in many of these 
neighborhoods as well. In articulating their reasons for opposition, residents frequently 
raise concerns about the negative impact a mosque would have on the image of their 
neighborhoods and the value of their homes, and voice fears that the problems suffered 
by poorer areas (i.e., crime and drugs) might enter their neighborhoods along with the 
immigrant populations served by mosques. In Santa Coloma, for instance, one of the 
most intense mosque polemics in Catalonia surfaced in 2004 when a Muslim 
community in the city opened a small oratory in the lower middle-class neighborhood of 
Singuerlín, a neighborhood consisting mainly of internal migrants to Catalonia but with 
very few foreign immigrants. For weeks, residents of the neighborhood protested each 
night outside the mosque, shouting insults and using noisemakers to disrupt evening 
prayers. Many carried pre-printed signs stating, “No to the mosque in Singuerlín. 
Residents, support the neighborhood. We do not want another Fondo,” referring to the 
city‟s most ethnically diverse neighborhood.14 Jaume, an intercultural mediator who 
played an active role mediating the dispute recalls: 
 
                                                 
13 Here, I draw on L. Wacquant (2008, p. 160), who defines the term “ghetto” as “a homogeneous social 
formation, bearing a unitary cultural identity, endowed with an advanced organizational autonomy and 
institutional duplication, based on a dichotomous cleavage between races (i.e., fictively biologized ethnic 
categories) officially recognized by the state.” 
14 For a powerful visual rendering of the conflict in Singuerlín, see ARANDA, A. and G. CRUZ 
(directors). (2005). “¡Mezquita No!” Spain: A Contraluz Films and Tururut Art Infogràfic. 
“¡Mezquita No!”: The Origins of Mosque Opposition in Spain 
 
GRITIM-UPF Working Paper Series n. 3 (2009) 21 
One of the greatest worries that (those in) Singuerlín had was that they did not want 
– these are their words, eh – they did not want to resemble Fondo. It (the mosque) 
would have the effect of bringing more immigration... And one of the 
preoccupations was precisely that, that they did not want Singuerlín to be converted 
into a Fondo – viewing Fondo as something bad, no?  Or with negativity, which 
does not have to be the case.  
 
Similarly, in Granollers, another city in the Barcelona area, the acquisition of an 
apartment intended for a mosque in the middle-class neighborhood of Tres Torres 
generated significant opposition in March of 2001. According to local media coverage, 
residents were concerned primarily with the impact that a greater Muslim presence 
would have on their neighborhood‟s image, real-estate value, and level of security.15  In 
contrast to opposition in marginalized neighborhoods, opposition in neighborhoods of 
higher standing thus aims to maintain certain places as spaces of privilege.   
As a consequence of these two types of opposition, mosques in Barcelona often 
have been treated as „hot potatoes,‟ encountering opposition in multiple neighborhoods 
by residents seeking either to resist or maintain extant infra-municipal hierarchies of 
privilege.
16
  In the face of such opposition, local governments and Muslim communities 
often have no recourse other than to locate mosques in non-residential areas, most 
commonly in industrial warehouses far away from where most Muslims actually live. 
While this may provide a short-term solution to the conflicts that have emerged, it 
contributes to the peripheralization of Islam from urban life, hinders residents from 
growing accustomed to mosques in their neighborhoods, and delays the process of 
cultural and religious acceptance.     
 
Relations with Local Governments 
Mosque opposition would likely be less prevalent in Barcelona if residents in 
neighborhoods where mosques have been proposed had more confidence in their local 
governments to manage the challenges associated with immigration and ethnic 
diversification.   As stated above, most of these neighborhoods are inhabited largely by 
internal migrants who suffered extreme neglect by local authorities during the 1960s 
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 GIMÉNEZ, R. (2001). “Los marroquíes se retiran de Tres Torres.” Revista del Vallés, March 30: 7; 
LACRUZ, D. (2001). “Un 62% de los vecinos no quieren tener una Mezquita árabe en su calle.” Revista 
del Vallés, March 30: 10. 
16
 I thank Mikel Aramburu for this analogy. 
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and 1970s, when Franco was still in power. Efforts to locate mosques in these 
neighborhoods often spark memories of past failures by local administrations to 
prioritize their needs. A common complaint among residents is that other services and 
facilities, such as libraries, day care centers, and police stations, are of greater 
importance than mosques. Local governments, they argue, should prioritize these 
services and facilities, rather than mosques and other structures that damage the image 
and well-being of their neighborhoods. For this reason, several of the most intensive 
mosque opposition campaigns have centered their complaints on the cession of public 
funds or land for mosque establishment.
17
   
Even in neighborhoods that have improved significantly over time, such as 
Singuerlín in Santa Coloma, many residents maintain an activist orientation and 
perceive their local governments as unresponsive to their needs for services and 
facilities. For instance, Juan, the president of the local neighborhood association 
remarks: 
 
Facilities have arrived because the people have fought. If they hadn‟t fought, there 
would be no facilities... It is lamentable. I trusted that when democracy arrived, all 
this would not have to happen – there wouldn‟t be demonstrations, politicians 
would build facilities – but I see that this is not the case. Everything must occur 
through struggle... And democracy should not be like this. I don‟t want to live like a 
“Maharaja” (high king) or be gifted anything, but I am paying my taxes and I have 
the right to have them build me a health clinic, a day care center, a school. 
 
In several instances, feelings of discontent with the state are bound up with 
perceptions that local governments favor wealthier central neighborhoods where 
residents have deeper roots in the region. This contributes to a sense of relative 
deprivation with respect to the allocation of attention and resources, and reinforces 
distrust in local governments.
18
  Issues related to immigration in particular, especially 
those dealing with the establishment of minority businesses and houses of worship, have 
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 The use of public funds or cession of public land was central to mosque polemics in several 
municipalities in Catalonia, most notably Badalona, Lleida, Reus, and Santa Coloma.   
18
 For a theorization of the connection between perceptions of relative deprivation and contentious action, 
see the work of T. Gurr (1968; 1970). 
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become one of the focal points of resident discontent with local governance.
19
  For 
instance, José María, a 57 year-old migrant from Extremadura and active member of a 
coalition against a proposed mosque in Badalona, emphatically states: 
 
You‟ve seen how deteriorated the neighborhood is. It lacks trees, it lacks benches, 
there is trash everywhere, there are rats bigger than this table, they don‟t clean the 
trash bins. They want this to be a ghetto... Why don‟t they bring all this to the 
center – these (immigrant) shops... why don‟t they place them there, in the center of 
Badalona?  They say they belong here.  (There) they don‟t give them permits, but 
here they do. Here they don‟t check the permits or anything. So what happens – do 
they think we‟re stupid or what?  We pay taxes just as they do!  Everyone pays, 
everyone pays! 
 
Given that resistance to mosques is bound up with broader perceptions of unfair 
treatment by local governments, the state is often identified as one of the main culprits 
by those opposing mosques. For example, the aforementioned manifesto opposing the 
new mosque in Badalona begins by stating: 
 
We the residents of Artigas and Sant Roc denounce the state of degradation, lack of 
security and coexistence that we have in our neighborhoods. The disinterest and 
neglect of the city government in controlling the state of the area -- over-occupied 
apartments, businesses without license, occupation of public thoroughfares and 
private spaces with a complete lack of compliance with urban norms and (norms of) 
coexistence by groups of people of different ethnicities -- has provoked an over-
occupation of space that makes it impossible to live and work in normality and to 
coexist (emphasis added). 
 
Interestingly, a leftist party or coalition has been in power in 24 of the 30 
municipalities that have been host to mosque opposition in Catalonia, demonstrating 
that mosque opposition is not simply a matter of ideological conservatism. This trend 
may be explained largely by the fact that many of these municipalities are host to large 
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 With respect to immigrant businesses, the primary complaints among residents relate less to crude 
competition and more to the impact of these businesses on the image of their neighborhoods. Many 
believe that having too many immigrant businesses makes it unappealing for people of higher status to 
visit or settle in the neighborhood. 
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populations of migrant workers who were once active in the labor movement and 
historically have leaned toward socialist or communist parties. As a consequence, 
however, conservative opposition parties, most notably the Popular Party and 
Convergència i Unió, have taken advantage of resident discontent to make electoral 
gains in municipalities where they have traditionally had little sway among voters. In 
some cases, most notably Premià de Mar and Badalona, they have had significant 
success through fomenting anti-mosque discourses.
20
  These discourses, however, are 
not successful solely because they are anti-mosque, but rather because they speak to real 
concerns that residents have about the degradation of their neighborhoods, the misuse of 
public resources, and the general inattentiveness of local governments to the needs of 
long-standing residents.
21
   
 
A Point of Comparison: The Case of Madrid 
Given that the population of Madrid‟s metropolitan area, like that of Barcelona, 
grew exponentially due to internal migration and historically has been relatively activist 
in orientation,
22
 should we not expect to see similar dynamics between successive 
waves of migrants in the two areas?   Why has organized opposition to mosques been 
absent in Madrid, despite the fact that the region hosts Spain‟s second largest Muslim 
population and suffered a terrorist attack in 2004?  The answer, I argue, lies in the 
distinct way in which municipalities that host large Muslim populations in Madrid have 
developed socially and spatially over time, as compared to municipalities in Barcelona.   
A major difference between large municipalities in the metropolitan areas of 
Madrid and Barcelona is that, with the exception of the capital city of Madrid itself, 
municipalities in Madrid have much less pronounced infra-municipal inequalities, 
despite the similarity of their overall size to large municipalities in Barcelona.   This has 
resulted from the distinct way in which they have developed historically. In contrast to 
                                                 
20
 In Premià de Mar, the critiques suffered by the Socialist mayor during a heated mosque polemic in the 
city between 2001 and 2002 by both mainstream and far-right opposition parties led to the election of a 
right-of-center administration in the following election. In Badalona, the Popular Party‟s active 
involvement in anti-mosque discourses and signature campaigns has led to steady gains in the past two 
municipal elections. 
21
It is beyond the scope of this paper to address all of the influences that opposition parties, and in some 
instances far right parties, have had on the intensity and trajectory of mosque polemics in Catalonia. 
While it would be a mistake to claim that mosque opposition has been orchestrated entirely by opposition 
parties, it is important to recognize the role they have played in legitimating resident opposition.  
22
 Internal migrants to Madrid, like those to Barcelona, have a legacy of working-class activism and had 
to struggle very hard to pressure local administrations to address deficits in municipal services and 
infrastructure upon arriving to the area (A. BIER 1980).  
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Barcelona, Madrid‟s metropolitan area did not grow significantly until the second half 
of the 20
th
 century. For it was not until then that major industrial development came to 
Madrid. Hence, whereas the population of Barcelona‟s surrounding area already had 
ascended to nearly 700,000 inhabitants by 1950, what would later become Madrid‟s 
metropolitan area had a combined population of less than 150,000 at this time. 
Figure 6: Evolution of the Metropolitan Areas of Barcelona and Madrid (1900-
1960)* 
 
Sources: Compiled by author using data from the Insituto Nacional de Estadística and the Instituto de 
Estadística de Cataluña. 
* The municipalities of Barcelona and Madrid are not included in this figure. 
 
With the development of significant industrial production in Madrid during the late 
1950s and early 1960s came the creation of a series of “dormitory suburbs” surrounding 
the capital city (F. BECKER ZUAZUA, 2007; R. LÓPEZ DE LUCIO, 1998; R. 
MÉNDEZ GUTIÉRREZ DEL VALLE, 1995). Municipalities in Madrid‟s “inner ring,” 
such as Getafe and Leganés,  began to experience major population booms in the 1960s, 
while municipalities in its “outer ring,” such as Fuenlabrada and Parla, did not 
experience major population booms until the early 1970s (J. RODRÍGUEZ JIMÉNEZ 
& G. GÓMEZ-ESCALONILLA, 2008). Rather than developing piecemeal, as did cities 
in Barcelona through successive waves of migration, municipalities in Madrid 
ballooned in size and grew rapidly into cities within the span of a couple decades 
(Figure 7). Given this more compressed time frame, most neighborhoods were 
constructed in a similar manner and hosted comparable proportions of internal migrant 
populations, resulting in a greater degree of infra-municipal social and economic 
equality. This equality was facilitated by the fact that most internal migrants to Madrid 
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either circulated within the same region or came from contiguous regions (A. BIER, 
1980). The absence of a strong national identity and distinct language in Madrid, 
moreover, facilitated the acceptance and incorporation of migrants into social life. 
Indeed, the relative ease with which internal migrants were integrated in Madrid has led 
to the disappearance of term “internal migrant” as a meaningful social category, 
whereas it is still commonly used to describe collectives residing in Catalonia. 
Figure 7: Evolution of the Metropolitan Area of Madrid (1900-2008)* 
 
Sources: Compiled by author using data from the Insituto Nacional de Estadística. 
* The municipality of Madrid is not included in this figure. 
 
Still today, cities in the Madrid metropolitan area typically display a great deal of 
homogeneity in neighborhood character. Although some upscale housing has been built 
in the peripheries of these cities in recent years, disparities between neighborhoods 
remain much less pronounced than in Barcelona. As a result, real estate prices vary less, 
resulting in a less concentrated distribution of new immigrant populations. This claim is 
supported by a comparison of census data showing the distribution of foreigners across 
census tracts in the nine largest cities in Madrid and Barcelona (see Appendix). 
Given that the city of Madrid itself has been the political capital of Spain for 
several centuries, it has more in common with major cities in Barcelona than do the 
municipalities in its metropolitan area, insofar as it has grown steadily over a relatively 
long period of time. As a result, the city of Madrid, not unlike cities in Barcelona, has a 
large diversity of neighborhoods that are readily distinguished by the socioeconomic 
status of their inhabitants. Still, neighborhood differences in Madrid are not as stark as 
in Barcelona. This is reflected in the distribution of immigrants across neighborhoods.  
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Although Madrid and Barcelona are both 17% foreign in composition, Madrid has just 
three census tracts in which 50% or more of the residents are foreign, compared to 20 in 
Barcelona, despite the fact that Madrid has roughly twice as many residents as 
Barcelona. Moreover, Barcelona has five census tracts in which 60% or more of the 
population is foreign with a peak of 83%, while the maximum in Madrid is 56%.
23
   
The differences between Barcelona and Madrid are more pronounced, however, 
when we move outside the capital cities themselves to the major municipalities in their 
metropolitan areas. Despite the fact that major cities in Madrid have attracted large 
immigrant populations over that past 15 years, not a single one possesses a census tract 
that reaches 50% immigrant in composition. By contrast, five of the Barcelona 
metropolitan area‟s eight largest cities possess census tracts that are over 50% foreign, 
and in some cities, there are tracts that reach 60% or 70%. With respect to mosque 
opposition and other types of ethnic conflict, the most intense cases have taken place 
precisely in the cities that exhibit the highest levels of immigrant concentration and 
spatial segregation, including Badalona, Terrassa, Mataró, and Santa Coloma (see 
Appendix). 
In Barcelona‟s cities, foreign populations tend to cluster spatially around the 
periphery, whereas they tend to cluster around the center of Madrid‟s cities. However, 
the disparities between center and periphery are much more pronounced in Barcelona 
than in Madrid, as many neighborhoods in Barcelona‟s metropolitan area have remained 
untouched by immigration, while others have experienced major ethnic diversification. 
This has contributed significantly to the feeling that here are “two Badalonas,” “two 
Matarós,” or “two Santa Colomas,” one of which is central, affluent, and well-
accommodated, and the other of which is peripheral, poor, and neglected. In Madrid, by 
contrast, the neighborhoods that have remained untouched by immigration are less 
numerous and are mostly new urbanizations located in city peripheries. Such 
neighborhoods are generally strictly residential in character and are not viewed with 
envy by those residing in city centers. 
Given the more equal distribution of immigrants across neighborhoods in Madrid, 
residents do not fear that immigration will exacerbate extant infra-municipal divisions 
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 In addition to the fact that immigrant clustering is less pronounced in the capital city of Madrid than in 
the city of Barcelona, the presence of two large, purpose-built mosques in Madrid, one of which was 
inaugurated in 1988 and the other in 1992, may play a role in explaining the absence of opposition in 
Spain‟s capital, as these mosques provide large and well-accommodated spaces for worshipers to gather 
in the city. Even with these two mosques, however, there are 19 other oratories serving the city of 
Madrid‟s Muslim population, according to data from the Fundación de Pluralismo y Convivencia. 
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or engender ethnic “ghettos,” despite the fact that the overall level of immigration is 
similar in proportion to that in Barcelona. To be sure, it is not the case that established 
residents in Madrid have no complaints whatsoever with regard to immigration. They 
frequently complain about how unfair preference is given to foreign immigrants with 
respect to social services and tax breaks, and immigrants are often associated with 
delinquency and crime. With respect to mosques in particular, residents sometimes 
complain about noise, traffic, crowding, and other such issues. However, such 
complaints are individual in nature and do not lead to organized protests that mobilize 
large segments of the community, as they do in Barcelona.   
The case of Parla, which has Madrid‟s second largest Muslim community and one 
small basement mosque, is particularly illustrative.
24
 The dearth of space for Muslims to 
pray has led worshipers to spill out into the streets on Fridays and major holidays, 
generating complaints by some residents who live in the building where the mosque is 
located. The president of the local neighborhood association remarks: 
 
Of course we have received some complaints, above all when it is Ramadan or one 
of their holidays because of course mosques, they‟re called mosques but they are 
not adequate for the... Muslim population here in Parla. So, they have to do it (pray) 
in the street... Of course cutting off a street, where residents do not have access to 
their home... It bothered people. 
 
But he adds that the complaints were minimal and always individual. The vice-president 
of the mosque echoes this point: 
 
They were individual complaints... Moreover, from the same person... But I can 
only understand that the complaints are caused by or originate from the use of the 
sidewalk and not for any other reason. 
 
Despite the fact that mosques in Parla and other cities in Madrid generate the same 
types of complaints regarding noise, traffic, and crowding in the streets that are heard in 
Barcelona, these complaints remain tied to practical difficulties presented by mosques 
and prayer gatherings themselves, and they are not connected by residents to more 
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 Only the city of Madrid has a larger Muslim community than Parla within the Madrid metropolitan 
area. 
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general struggles regarding urban privilege and state recognition, as they are in 
Barcelona. The reason is that foreign immigrants as a whole have followed the model of 
internal migrants in dispersing relatively evenly across neighborhoods, and so few 
residents feel unfairly burdened by the problems associated with foreign immigration. 
Moreover, there is generally less concern about certain neighborhoods becoming the 
locus of immigrant concentration and activity. For this reason, residents interviewed in 
Madrid never cited fears about their neighborhoods becoming “ghettos,” as was 
commonly the case in Barcelona, and often made explicit reference to how the even 
distribution of immigrants across neighborhoods has hindered the emergence of social 
conflicts. Given the absence of pronounced socio-spatial divisions in Madrid‟s 
metropolitan area, the idea that a mosque might exacerbate imbalances in the 
distribution of immigrants or threaten the privileges enjoyed by certain neighborhoods 
is simply not something that occurs to residents of cities in Madrid‟s metropolitan area. 
 
Discussion 
The analysis advanced above suggests that socio-spatial divisions and inequalities, 
as well as perceptions that local governments are unresponsive to the needs of certain 
neighborhoods, have played a powerful role in contributing to the emergence of mosque 
opposition in Barcelona. This is not to minimize the relevance of prejudices against 
Muslims, North Africans, and immigrants in general, or the significance of fears related 
to economic competition. However, focusing on these factors alone, as has been the 
case in most recent work on attitudes and practices toward immigrants and other 
minorities, risks overlooking how characteristics of the relational settings within which 
distinct groups coexist influence the texture of their interactions. Specifically, 
contention surrounding the presence of mosques and other issues related to immigrant 
presence is more likely to occur in settings characterized by: 1) strong social 
distinctions; 2) coinciding spatial divisions; and 3) perceptions among long-standing 
residents that local authorities are inattentive to their needs and priorities. When these 
factors are present, immigrants are likely to cluster heavily in narrowly-circumscribed 
areas, increasing their visibility and the likelihood that their presence will be integrated 
into more general struggles surrounding urban privilege. In addition, it is more probable 
that residents will feel the need to take their own initiative in opposing immigrant 
presence, as opposed to leaving it to local governments to manage the challenges 
brought about by ethnic diversification. 
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The relational approach advanced in this paper bears certain parallels to the 
“figurational approach” advanced by N. Elias (1965) in his now classic work, The 
Established and the Outsiders. Both approaches emphasize the importance of focusing 
on the character of relations between different actors and groups, as opposed to their 
ascribed attributes, for understanding the texture of intergroup relations. However, the 
approach advocated in this paper requires that we go beyond looking solely at 
imbalances in power between different groups and pushes us to examine how intergroup 
relations are mediated by the concrete settings or places in which diverse groups 
interact, as well as by the relations that these groups bear to governing entities. Long-
standing residents often perceive the entry of immigrants into a given neighborhood not 
only as a threat to their position vis-à-vis the newly-arrived immigrants, but also as a 
threat to the image of their neighborhoods vis-à-vis other neighborhoods. Moreover, as 
the examples cited in this paper illustrate, concerns provoked by immigration frequently 
relate more centrally to transformations of place (i.e., rising levels of insecurity, 
increased territorial stigmatization, and decreased prospects for neighborhood 
revitalization) than to direct competition over economic resources and political power. 
The specific utility of conceptualizing contexts of reception as relational settings and 
analyzing the processes elaborated above is that doing so helps to explain why such 
concerns are more salient in some contexts than in others.  
The settings in Barcelona and Madrid that have been discussed in this paper are 
relatively large municipalities with over 100,000 inhabitants. In explaining differences 
in how residents have responded to mosques in each metropolitan area, I have argued 
that the neighborhood and city are the relevant units of analysis, given that mosque 
opposition has centered largely around struggles over infra-municipal privilege and 
recognition. In other instances, it may be the case that analyzing similar processes 
requires utilizing distinct units of analysis, since many people, especially those residing 
in smaller municipalities, assess their status and the status of their surroundings in 
relation to other municipalities in the vicinity, as opposed to other neighborhoods.
25
 In 
determining which units are appropriate to a given analysis, scholars must be attentive 
to the subjective frames within which residents understand their social position and 
evaluate their experiences. The more general point is that the boundaries of relational 
                                                 
25
 With respect to mosque opposition, for instance, there appear to be some cases where residents fear that 
the establishment of a mosque in their municipality will lead to an influx of immigrants from other, more 
working-class municipalities in the area. 
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settings should not be assumed to be the same in all instances or to coincide perfectly 
with administrative categories, but rather must be determined in accordance with the 
frames of reference that people use in their everyday lives. 
Highlighting the relevance of relational settings and the historical development of 
these settings in Barcelona for explaining current contention surrounding mosques is by 
no means a call for radical particularism in the study of ethnic conflict. While it is true 
that factors particular to Barcelona, such as the strong national identity of its inhabitants 
and the timing of industrialization in the area, are crucial for understanding the 
development of social and spatial inequalities that have complicated the reception of 
mosques, similar processes may be seen elsewhere in Spain as well. In Seville 
(Andalusia), for instance, where the most intense and enduring episode of mosque 
contention outside of Catalonia has taken place, the main arguments employed by those 
opposing the erection of a mosque in their neighborhoods similarly have related to more 
general feelings of marginalization and urban injustice. Specifically, residents of 
Bermejales and San Jerónimo, two peripheral neighborhoods of the city, have 
complained that they lack needed facilities and services that ought to be prioritized over 
mosques, and that their communities should not be the “trash bin for what is not desired 
by other neighborhoods.”26  Although discussing the case of Seville in detail is beyond 
the scope of this paper, it is worth noting that its traditionally robust economy in 
comparison to the rest of Andalusia parallels Catalonia‟s strong economic standing 
relative to Spain as a whole in key ways, and has led it to follow a similar course of 
urban development through successive waves of migration to that followed by industrial 
cities in Barcelona. Consequently, social cleavages and neighborhood inequalities are 
similarly pronounced in Seville. The presence of such cleavages and the manner in 
which they map onto urban space cannot be ignored if we are to understand how 
established residents react to mosques and other structures that serve immigrant 
populations.   
In addition to helping us understand reactions to immigration, the conclusions 
drawn above may have implications for understanding more generally how settled 
                                                 
26
 See “Los vecinos de San Jerónimo entregan mañana 3.000 firmas contrarias a la ubicación de la 
mezquita.” (2009). Europa Press, November 3; Unas 200 personas se concentran en Los Bermejales 
contra la mezquita y denuncian un 'boicot' a la protesta.” (2005). Europa Press, March 19; “Vecinos de 
Los Bermejales amenazan con „echarse a la calle‟ si se sigue adelante con el proyecto de la mezquita.” 
(2006). Europa Press, September 30; “Vecinos de Los Bermejales piden dotaciones sociales en los 
terrenos de la mezquita.” (2004). ABC, March 12; “Vecinos de San Jerónimo se reúnen hoy con 
urbanismo para expresar su rechazo a la mezquita, con 2.000 firmas.” (2009). Europa Press, September 
30. 
Avi Astor 
 
GRITIM-UPF Working Paper Series n. 3 (2009) 32 
communities react to the perceived threat posed by outsiders. Consider, for example, 
popular movements known as “NIMBY” („Not in my backyard‟) campaigns, 
particularly those related to facilities serving stigmatized populations. The complaints 
voiced by participants in such campaigns bear a striking resemblance to the complaints 
raised by those opposing mosques in Spain. Yet such campaigns are all too often 
reduced by scholars to clear and straightforward instances of racism and efforts to 
maintain certain places as spaces of “white privilege” (P. HUBBARD, 2005a; 2005b; R. 
WILTON, 2002). Indeed, several scholars have become increasingly critical of the 
usage of the acronym NIMBY in a pejorative manner to denote the irrationality and 
selfishness of those engaged in local protest, and have called for a more theoretically 
rigorous framework for analyzing the causes of local opposition (K. BURNINGHAM, 
2000; P. DEVINE-WRIGHT, 2009; W. KEMPTON ET AL., 2005; M. WOLSINK, 
2006). Analyzing the places in which such opposition tends to occur as relational 
settings and exploring the relevance of the processes discussed in this paper to other 
types of local opposition campaigns could move us closer to developing such a 
framework. 
 
Conclusion 
Since the events of September 11
th
, explanations of mosque opposition and other 
episodes of contention surrounding Islamic presence have tended to focus exclusively 
on crude xenophobia or alleged cultural incompatibilities. In most cases, such 
explanations have the effect of reinforcing the reductive dichotomy of “Islam versus the 
West” that has come to dominate popular debates concerning the periodic tensions that 
have emerged surrounding Muslim integration. Part of the reason that this paradigm 
continually reproduces itself through work on this topic is that academics and non-
academics alike are often inattentive to important features of the relational settings in 
which Muslims and non-Muslims coexist and interact. This trend is not unique to 
studies of tension surrounding Muslim presence in Western contexts, but rather is 
common to studies of intergroup conflict in a variety of settings. The main aim of this 
paper has been to develop the theoretical tools necessary for analyzing responses to 
ethnic and religious diversification in context, and in so doing, to make possible richer 
and more nuanced analyses of the sources of conflict between long-standing residents 
and newly-arrived minorities.   
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Cities Host to Mosque Opposition in Spain 
Region City Year(s) of Opposition 
Andalusia 
Granada 1985 – 2002  
Nijar  2004  
Seville 2004 – 2009 (Multiple Neighborhoods) 
Balearic Islands 
Felanitx 2008 
Marratxí 2005 
Castile and 
León 
Las Navas del Marqués 2004 
Soria 2003 
Catalonia 
Anglès  2007 – 2009 
Arenys de Munt* 2010 
Badalona* 2002, 2005 – 2007, 2009 (Multiple Neighborhoods) 
Balaguer  2008 
Banyoles 1999 
Barcelona* 2004, 2007 (Multiple Neighborhoods) 
Canet de Mar* 1995 
Cornellà de Llobregat * 2005 
Figueres 2002 
Girona 2008-2009 
Granollers* 2000, 2001 (Multiple Neighborhoods) 
Les Franqueses*  2003 
Llagostera  2004 
Lleida  2001 – 2009 (Multiple Neighborhoods) 
Manresa  2008 
Mataró* 2001 
Mollet del Vallès*  2004 
Montblanc  2007 
Premià de Mar* 1997, 2001 – 2002 (Multiple Neighborhoods) 
Reus  2001 – 2004 (Multiple Neighborhoods) 
Ripoll  2008 
Salt  2008 
Sant Boi de Llobregat* 2005 
Sant Feliu de Guíxols  2004 
Santa Coloma de Gramenet* 2004 
Santa Cristina d´Aro  2007 
Torroella de Montgrí  2001 – 2002  
Vic 1990, 1998 (Multiple Neighborhoods) 
Viladecans* 2002, 2004 
Vilafranca del Penedès*  2004 
Extremadura Talayuela 2006 
Galicia Vilaboa 2006 
Murcia 
Beniel 2009 – 2010 
Lorca 2006 
Murcia  2008 
Basque Country Vitoria-Gasteiz 2007 
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Valencia 
Alicante 2005, 2009 (Multiple Neighborhoods) 
Alzira 2007 
Castellón de la Plana 1999 
Cocentaina 2008 
Cullera 2007 
La Vall d'Uixó 2009 
Llíria 2004 
Vila-real 2006 
 
Source: Author‟s review of Spanish press and SOS Racismo‟s annual reports on racism in Spain. 
* Located in the Barcelona Metropolitan Area 
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Figure A1: Distribution of Foreign Populations in Madrid and Barcelona’s Nine 
Largest Municipalities 
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